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This paper treats low inflation in EMU as a collective action problem for Ecofin. The SGP 
and more broadly the BEPG, operating against a background of the ECB and wage-setting, 
are the instruments for this. The ECB delegates sanctioning to the member-states while pre-
serving the authority to set interest rates. Labour relations systems in different countries pur-
sue disinflationary wage settlements. The BEPG (including the SGP) therefore have to be un-
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the summer of 2002, the Stability and Growth Pact, the institutional framework for fis-
cal policy in EMU which is supposed to accompany the new monetary arrangements, has 
come under severe fire. Keynesian economists, finance ministers and lately even Commission 
president Romano Prodi have pointed out the problems with it. Even usually more conserva-
tive observers such as the Financial Times and the Economist have argued against the current 
Stability and Growth Pact and called for a revision.  
It is crucial for such a debate on the future of the Stability and Growth Pact to be built on 
a more subtle understanding than the currently prevailing one. In this paper, which presents a 
preliminary analysis of the institutions involved in fiscal policy-making in EMU and their op-
eration over the three years since EMU, I make two substantive points. The first is that a 
proper understanding of fiscal policy-making in EMU, requires locating it within its broader 
institutional context. This involves analysing how the configuration of the Broad Economic 
Policy Guidelines (BEPG) and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) directly influences gov-
ernment policy in member-states; it also requires understanding how wage-setters and the 
ECB (may) influence that fiscal policy configuration. Such a contextualised understanding of 
fiscal policy offers a better understanding of how the SGP actually operates, and why it may 
produce counterintuitive outcomes.  
The second point is that an analysis of the three years of the BEPG and the SGP in action 
suggests that EMU operates in a macro-economic policy framework that is very different 
from many of its conventional interpretations. Within a low-inflation context provided by the 
wage bargainers (see Hancké 2002; Hancké & Soskice 2003), the parties in the BEPG seem to 
accept fiscal discretion as long as it is neutral with regard to inflation or contributes to disin-
flation. Paradoxically, therefore, by reintroducing fiscal policy as an adjustment mechanism, 
this policy framework obtains a much more Keynesian character than commonly assumed.  
The paper is organised as follows. The next section sets the question by discussing the 
operation of the fiscal policy institutions in EMU. Section 3 develops a simple model that can 
make sense of some of the counterintuitive findings reported in section 2. The fourth section 
empirically compares the two instances of the BEPG and the SGP in action: the incident over 
the Irish budget in 2001 and the discussion of the German budget in 2002. The final section 
concludes by integrating the material and presenting a series of questions which follow from 
this discussion.  
 
 
2. Fiscal policy-making institutions in EMU 
 
As has been argued by several authors, the advent of EMU has profoundly changed the logic 
of macro-economic decision-making in the EMU (and EU) member-states. Centralised mone-
tary policy in the ECB was linked to a decentralised fiscal policy in which individual coun-
tries retain the authority for taxation and expenditure. In order to deal with the co-ordination 
problems that might ensue as a result of this asymmetry in policy-making, the EMU member-
states agreed to a model of policy co-ordination --the OMC-- through the SGP, which applied 
solely to EMU member-states, and the EU-wide BEPG (Maher and Hodson 2001),  
The political history of the SGP is not without importance and explains why it appears, 
on paper at least, as a stringent monetarist disciplining device. In part to buy acquiescence 
from the Bundesbank to go ahead with EMU, and in part to alleviate German fears of south-
ern-European lack of fiscal prudence, the SGP imposed strict fiscal discipline by turning the 
logic of the Maastricht criteria into an unwritten economic constitution for EMU. The SGP is 
part of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and therefore a binding document for all EMU mem-
ber-states. Hancké: Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in EMU 7 
The most important components of the SGP are that governments accept a 3% budget 
deficit maximum --except under very specific circumstances of negative growth (the exces-
sive deficit procedure), and a balanced budget over the cycle and within the foreseeable future. 
The institutional vehicle that assures compliance with these provisions is Ecofin (in collabora-
tion with the Commission), which organises what is called 'mutual surveillance'. 
The excessive deficit procedure. When the budget deficit of an EMU member-state 
reaches 3%, a series of automatic procedures are set in motion: the Commission reports on the 
member-state's transgression, Ecofin evaluates the Commission's report and issues a warning. 
If no corrective action is taken, the member-state is provisionally fined (up to 0.5% of its 
GDP), a fine it foregoes if the deficit is not in line by the second year after the initial warning. 
Balanced budgets. The SGP stipulates that government budgets have to be balanced both 
over the cycle and within foreseeable future. The year initially proposed for balanced budgets 
was 2004, but as a result of the low growth period in the EU since 2000, appears to be nego-
tiable. The idea underlying this policy is that a balanced budget offers states more freedom for 
a fiscal stimulus when growth slows without breaching the SGP. 
Mutual surveillance. Formally, the SGP is part of the EMU framework only, and there-
fore in principle only applies the member-states in monetary union. However, its operation is 
embedded more broadly in the BEPG (combining to form the OMC), As a result, EU mem-
ber-states that are not members of EMU, such as the UK, Sweden, and Denmark, participate 
in the implementation of the SGP in exchange for peer-monitoring their economies in Ecofin -
-the Council of EU Finance and Economics Ministers. Ecofin thus becomes the institutional 
vehicle for the implementation of the BEPG in general and the SGP in particular. 
By the end of 2002, it had become increasingly obvious that the SGP was operating along 
very different lines than those envisioned by its architects. Most importantly, perhaps, in the 
only instance in which the excessive deficit procedure could (or should) have been invoked --
in February 2002, when the German deficit came very close to the 3% deficit ceiling-- the let-
ter of the SGP, which called for a low-level reprimand, was not followed. In contrast, when 
Ireland ran a budget surplus a year earlier, the Council of Ministers voiced a strongly worded 
concern that Ireland was adopting economic policies at odds with the broader agreed-upon 
goals in the EU/EMU.  
Lest we ignore the issues at stake: the SGP is a binding international treaty with the force 
of law; how, then, should we understand this profound divergence between the letter of the 
SGP and its actual operation? What does this suggest about the SGP in particular and the 
broader macro-economic policy framework of EMU in general? While one group of authors 
deplores the lax interpretation of the SGP, and argues for a more stringent adherence to its 
rules (see Beetsma & Uhlig 1999; Gros 2002), another group argues that it is overly restric-
tive and that a redefinition of the SGP is necessary in order for the EU to avoid being stuck in 
a deflationary system within which individual member-states are bearing the costs of adjust-
ment (Canzoneri & Diba 2000; De Grauwe 2000; Schelkle 2002), The first group therefore 
sees both episodes as essentially punishable transgressions of the SGP, while the second ar-
gues that what happened to the Irish and the German budget plans demonstrates that the SGP 
is moot as a treaty. 
However, because of their normative character, neither of these arguments shed much 
light on how to understand the actual operation of the SGP: while these two positions come to 
radically different conclusions about the desirable future, they seem to agree on two elements. 
The first is that the SGP is best treated in perfect isolation from the rest of the macro-
economic policy framework within EMU; the second is that the letter of the SGP is the opti-
mal starting point for any political-economic analysis.  
Such a literal reading of the SGP seems to miss two points with important consequences. 
The SGP and the broader BEPG are embedded in a series of other institutions for economic 
policy-making at the EU/EMU level --the Commission, the Council of Ministers (Ecofin), and 8  European Political Economy Review – www.epic.ac.uk/eper  
   
the ECB. The interaction between those different institutions, against a background of low in-
flationary pressures provided by the wage-bargaining systems (Hancké 2002), has produced a 
profoundly different policy consensus from the one expressed in the SGP (see Eichengreen 
1998 for an early attempt to understand EMU as an integrated policy framework), 
In its simplest version, the argument goes like this: as long as member-states contribute to 
the goal of low aggregate EMU-wide inflation, either by pursuing explicitly disinflationary 
policies (frequently the result of wage moderation in domestic settlements) or at least by not 
adopting policies that incite inflation, the SGP is interpreted very liberally, both by Ecofin and 
by the ECB. In the case of emerging inflationary pressures within member-states (especially 
the larger ones), however, which might have effects on the EMU aggregate inflation rate, the 
response to such a threat is in the first instance initiated by the Council of Ministers itself. 
Ecofin could thus be regarded as a delegated monitor for the ECB. Note that such policies in 
principle support the ECB's stance without prejudging them. Generalised disinflationary poli-
cies allow the ECB to bracket out inflation and adjust monetary policy accordingly. If, how-
ever, the ECB judges Ecofin's decision to be insufficient, the central bank can always react 
independently by raising interest rates.  
However, since even member-states that behave properly will face the negative conse-
quences of an ECB reaction (Gatti & Van Wijnbergen 2002), Ecofin as a collective body 
faces very strong incentives to assure low inflation in EMU as a whole, but can be considera-
bly more lenient on fiscal policy that does not endanger the ECB's inflation target. This sug-
gests that the SGP is neither the orthodox restrictive monetarist tool that its proponents take it 
to be, nor the economic equivalent of a nuclear option that has no practical relevance because 
everybody shies away from deploying it, but de facto a soft Keynesian framework, which may 
leave considerable discretion to governments as long as budgets do not evolve significantly 
out of line with the EMU average and low inflation is maintained.
1 
This argument will be developed in two steps. The next section develops the idea that fis-
cal policy under EMU is a collective action problem. Section 4 compares the decisions re-
garding the fiscal stances of Ireland in February 2001 and Germany in 2002 to show that pol-
icy considerations very different from the monetarist interpretation of the SGP were at the ba-
sis of the decisions reached by the Council of Ministers: the Irish budget potentially endan-
gered the low inflation target of the ECB, while the German budget plans did not, and the re-
action by Ecofin was therefore very different in the two cases, reflecting the different implica-
tions of fiscal policy in the two countries.  
 
 
3. Fiscal policy-making as a collective action problem 
 
In order to understand the current macro-economic policy regime in EMU, of which fiscal 
policy is a constituent part, the most appropriate starting point is the relation between ECB 
and Ecofin. Monetary stability, expressed as low inflation, can be seen as a public good, of 
which all EMU members benefit (in the form of low interest rates), For public goods to exist 
at all, a framework of sanctions and incentives is required that imposes individual compliance 
with the collective goals.  
Within the EMU set-up, such sanctions do not exist. The EMU member-states have no 
tools to assure that the policies of individual member-states are congruent with a low collec-
tive inflation goal. In fact, the only mechanism that exists within EMU is the ECB's interest 
                                                 
1   Note that we are not arguing that the SGP is an optimal instrument. Many of the concerns voiced by more 
radical Keynesian authors and by some policy-makers, such as measuring deficits in structural rather than 
cyclical terms, applying a Golden rule, or even focusing on the EMU-aggregate fiscal situation, are very 
valid indeed. Our argument is that in its actual operation, the current BEPG already embodies embryonic ver-
sions of such proposals. Hancké: Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in EMU 9 
rate policy, but since the central bank's decisions affect all member states without distinguish-
ing between those with 'good' (i.e. disinflationary) and those with 'bad' (i.e. inflationary) be-
haviour (Gatti & Van Wijnbergen 2002), it is a very blunt instrument, that the well-behaving 
member-states would rather not see in operation, since it imposes asymmetric costs on them.  
This brings us to the SGP, and more broadly the BEPG. Precisely because it is impossible 
for the EMU member-states to punish inflationary policies in individual member-states, 
Ecofin resorts to the BEPG as a means of keeping individual member-states in check. Defec-
tions that endanger the public good, i.e. inflationary fiscal policies by individual member-
states, are sanctioned by the group as a whole, while non-inflationary fiscal policies are --with 
the silent support of the ECB-- left in relative peace. The SGP/BEPG framework is therefore 
not just a narrow instrument to control overly expansive fiscal policies, but also an indirect 
sanctioning mechanism for Ecofin in its derived goal of containing inflation. 
Ecofin can thus be seen as simultaneously a delegated monitor for the ECB and its first 
line of defence. With the use of the BEPG (including the SGP), the Council pre-empts a viru-
lent ECB reaction if individual member-states adopt inflationary policies, thus safeguarding 
the collective good of low inflation and avoiding a situation in which the (majority of) gov-
ernments toeing the disinflation line are punished when one or a few of them misbehave. Con-
versely, fiscal policies that do not endanger the ECB's low inflation target are left untouched, 
even if they break the formal provisions of the SGP --a stance that appeared to receive the 
tacit approval of the ECB.
2  
It is not hard to see --as we will develop in more detail in the next section-- that the de-
bate within Ecofin surrounding the Irish budget in February 2001 is an obvious case of the 
first of these situations. In a period of rapid growth and growing inflationary pressures, the 
Irish government ran a budget surplus, and therefore decided to lower taxes. Yet by doing so, 
the Irish government's policies raised inflationary dangers for the EMU as a whole --both di-
rectly (although the small size of the Irish economy in EMU would have structurally con-
tained those dangers) and indirectly by setting a bad example for others --and the Council re-
acted accordingly.  
The argument also helps understand the discussion surrounding Germany's budget deficit 
in February 2002 and its paradoxical outcome. Precisely because the German fiscal position 
was backed up by a situation of low and falling inflation and a commitment to keep domestic 
inflation in line with the EMU aggregate inflation rate, the Council of Ministers concluded 
that a sanction, however symbolic, was premature and unnecessary --and the ECB concurred 
by not raising objections. 
 
 
4. The SGP and the BEPG in action 
 
Since the adoption of the Euro in 1999, the institutional framework of fiscal policy-making 
has been put to the test twice: once in February 2001, when the Irish budget surplus was se-
verely criticised by the Council of Ministers, and again in February 2002, when Commis-
sioner Solbes requested a sanction for Germany and Portugal (a so-called 'blue letter', the 
equivalent of a yellow card in football) because their budgets were approaching the 3% 
                                                 
2   In late 2002 and early 2003, the ECB seemed to have changed its line on Ecofin, and began to  make loud 
public noises about the need to stick to the SGP. In all fairness I have to admit that  it is unclear at this mo-
ment whether this confirms or disconfirms the argument in this paper: the ECB might have feared that Ecofin 
was unable to do its job and therefore sent out a signal to Ecofin members, which is perfectly consistent with 
my argument; alternatively, this might herald a profound shift in ECB attitude from benign neglect to active 
involvement in fiscal policy. If the latter is the case, the ECB --and with it EMU as a whole-- might be walk-
ing on very thin ice: not only is it unclear if a central bank should or can be a Stackelberg leader in macro-
economic policy, it is also questionable if the ECB should respond to issues outside its strict mandate and 
thereby obfuscate its reaction function (Allsopp 2002).  10  European Political Economy Review – www.epic.ac.uk/eper  
   
budget deficit ceiling defined in the SGP. In both instances the ultimate outcome of the proc-
ess ran counter to the expectations of many. Despite a budget surplus (and therefore hardly 
prone to imprudent fiscal excesses), Ireland was fiercely reprimanded by the Council, while 
the German deficit in 2001 was condoned and in fact used as an argument to rethink the de-
tails of the SGP.  
This section will compare these two instances of the SGP and the BEPG in action. It will 
demonstrate that the counterintuitive outcomes in both cases take on a different shape if we 
assume an unspoken quasi-Keynesian consensus among the EMU/EU member-states and be-
tween them and the ECB, which allows for more discretion in fiscal policy than both the SGP 
and the BEPG appear to grant member-states. This discretion, however, is contingent upon 
the capacity of Ecofin to safeguarding low inflation. The comparison of these two cases thus 
illustrates the argument made above that inflationary fiscal or wage policies are punished by 
Ecofin while policies that do not contribute to rising inflation are not. The structure of the sec-
tion is straightforward. After a short review of events in the two cases, a longer section will 
discuss the relevant points of comparison.  
Ireland 2001. Prior to 2001, Irish economic growth had outpaced all its European coun-
terparts for several years. The effect of this period of rapid growth was that by the end of 
2000, high wage growth and the housing boom had led to an inflation level far above that of 
EMU as a whole: 4.2% as opposed to 1.2% for EMU (OECD 2002), In 2001, and backed up 
by a budget surplus, the government proposed lowering taxes for that year.  
Since these budget plans were seen as over-expansionary and therefore contributing to 
higher inflation in Ireland, especially in the absence of moderate wage growth levels to offset 
the fiscal expansion, Ecofin in response issued a recommendation to the Irish in February to 
revise its budget for 2001-2003 (the first step in the procedure of the BEPG), Even though 
technically the Irish were not in breach of the SGP, their fiscal policies contradicted the wider 
co-ordinated macro-economic policy framework of the BEPG, and as a result, Ecofin had lit-
tle choice but to formally sanction the Irish budgetary stance, which was directly responsible 
for inflationary pressures.
3 While developments in a small economy such as Ireland probably 
have very little direct impact on the aggregate inflation rate, the Irish policy stance was dan-
gerous because, if it passed unchecked, it sent the wrong signal to other, larger EMU member-
states, such as France and Spain, who might find themselves in a similar position after a few 
years of rapid growth.  
A comparison with developments in the Netherlands in 2001, when inflation jumped as 
the combined result of the oil and food demand shocks of 2000, a very tight labour market as 
a result of low unemployment, and a substantial tax break, is instructive. Ecofin did not issue 
a warning to the Dutch (despite the obvious inflationary dangers), because labour unions and 
government had reorganised to immediately react by keeping wage growth low: in response 
to the high inflation rate, real wages were scheduled to fall in the 2001-2002 wage round. In-
flation indeed fell from an annualised 4.6% in March 2001 to 3.6% in March 2002, and was 
forecast to fall to 2.9% in 2002 and 2.3% in 2003 --against a background of resuming high 
growth and stable low unemployment (Economist 4 may 2002),  
In sum, rather than a counterintuitive and misguided reaction, Ecofin's sanctioning of the 
Irish budget in 2001 made perfect sense when it is regarded as a direct attack on the inflation-
ary policy stance of the Irish government. With its budget, the Irish potentially endangered the 
aggregate low-inflation environment of EMU, thus increasing the risk of a reaction by the 
ECB that might have endangered macro-economic conditions in the entire EMU. Sanctioning 
the Irish stance was the only instrument at Ecofin's disposal to pre-empt such a reaction. 
                                                 
3   The fact that Irish fiscal policy itself was directly responsible for inflationary pressures made the application 
of the BEPG relatively easy. One might wonder if Ecofin would have issued a warning if potentially rising 
inflation had been a result of excessive wage settlements instead of fiscal policy. Hancké: Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in EMU 11 
Germany 2002. The situation was very different in Germany in February 2002. After sev-
eral years of below EMU-average growth, economic growth almost stalled in 2001. The result 
was that the German budget showed a deficit close to the 3% limit imposed by the SGP in 
both 2001 and 2002: 2.6% in 2001 and a forecast of 2.7% for 2002. Several developments 
combined to make the episode particularly poignant. In large measure as a result of low 
growth as well, unemployment started to rise again for the first time in four years, and since 
the Red-Green coalition had used the evolution of unemployment as a yardstick measure its 
performance, the government was left with little choice but to run a deficit in order to avoid a 
further rise in unemployment. An important element was operating in the background: 2002 is 
an election year, and Chancellor Schröder faced stiffer competition than expected from the 
CDU-CSU main opposition party, who challenged its macro-economic policy record.
4 
Relying on a strict interpretation of the SGP, the Commission therefore proposed to 
Ecofin in February 2002 to issue a formal reprimand to the German government. While there 
was a small group of orthodox hard-liners among the member-states (including Belgium and 
The Netherlands, countries who in the past or at the time were far from examples of fiscal rec-
titude), a large enough minority, led by Germany and the UK, managed to block a formal rep-
rimand. (Especially the UK's position was interesting: Gordon Brown strongly implied that 
the SGP would have to be rethought if the UK joined EMU in order to take account more 
clearly of structural instead of cyclical deficits, and to assess budgets over the cycle rather 
than at any particular point in time.)  
Ultimately, Ecofin did not sanction Germany and the Council simply avoided the issue, 
by asking the German government to balance its budget by 2004.
5 The Commission's reaction 
was --predictably-- one of disappointment and barely disguised anger: as the self-imposed 
guardian of the SGP, it felt sidetracked and betrayed by the Ecofin decision, and invoked 
stark images of the demise of the Euro as a result of the loss of credibility of the SGP. The 
ECB's reaction was considerably more surprising: instead of issuing a sharp condemnation of 
Ecofin's decision, the ECB was silent on the matter. This is all the more surprising since the 
ECB can be seen as the agent of financial markets in EMU (the principal), and in a monetarist 
world such a lax interpretation of the SGP could indeed undermine EMU's credibility. 
What can we learn from this comparison of the two instances of the SGP cum BEPG in 
operation? First of all, the letter of the SGP does not offer a helpful tool for interpreting these 
two cases. Ireland was not in breach of any of the provisions of the SGP, and Germany was 
on the verge of a breach. However, Ecofin paradoxically singled out the Irish stance and 
failed to condemn the German policies. Secondly, the ECB stood out because of its silence on 
the issue: it did not even issue a press release in response to the breach of the SGP in the case 
of the German budget in 2002. If the credibility of the SGP had really been at stake, a reaction 
from the ECB --any reaction-- could have been expected.  
Excessive formalism is therefore not a good guide for interpretation. A proper under-
standing of these two paradoxical outcomes requires a recalibration of the framework for in-
terpreting fiscal policy in EMU. In the case of the Irish budget, a reaction imposed itself to 
prevent a sharp retaliation by the ECB with effects beyond the Irish. The reaction predictably 
came via the framework offered by the BEPG, the only tool available to EMU member-states 
                                                 
4   The deficit had relatively few discretionary elements, and basically reflected the fall in government revenue. 
However, in principle the government had the possibility to run a smaller deficit, by rapidly raising taxes (as 
the Kohl government had done after German unification and Italy had done in the run-up to EMU), but it 
chose not to. This suggests that, despite the low level of discretionary spending, fiscal policy was indeed used 
as an anti-cyclical measure.  
5   More egoistic considerations by members of Ecofin might have informed the decision as well: Germany is 
the most important economy in EMU and the main trading partner of almost all other EMU member-states. 
As a result of these trade links, falling demand in Germany therefore would have had rapid and direct effects 
on growth in the other member-states, and allowing fiscal reflation in Germany assured that growth in other 
member-states did not suffer. Thanks to Dermot Hodson and Waltraud Schelkle for insisting on this point.  12  European Political Economy Review – www.epic.ac.uk/eper  
   
to sanction defections. In the German case, in contrast, the situation was very different: the 
Schröder government's policies did not endanger inflation, and no ECB reaction was therefore 
necessary. Consequently, Ecofin did not act.  
The crucial difference between Ireland and Germany was not its relation to the (letter of 
the) SGP, but their potential and real effects on inflation. Ireland's policy was both inflation-
ary and pro-cyclical. If it had not been kept in check, the entire EMU might have suffered as a 
result of a potential reaction by the ECB. Even though the Irish economy was too small in it-
self to weigh heavily in the aggregate EMU inflation rate, it set a bad example, since one de-
fection could have led to more. (The comparison with the situation in The Netherlands in 
2001/02 demonstrated this point: for cyclical reasons the country also experienced higher than 
EMU-aggregate inflation, but government and wage-setters immediately acted to contain it, 
and Ecofin did not issue a reprimand.) Ecofin thus punished the Irish budget on the basis of its 
inflationary potential, not on its own merits. 
Germany's policy, in contrast, was anti-cyclical and did not pose threats to low inflation. 
It therefore did not put the credibility of the SGP and EMU at risk, but isolated any risks that 
might emerge. Even within EMU, German fiscal policy can still be singled out by capital 
markets, by raising the risk premium on German debt and not on others. Furthermore, since 
German policies were not leading to rising inflationary pressures (inflation fell, in fact, from 
2.9% in 2001 to 1.6% in 2002, with a further fall forecast for 2003 and 2004), there was no 
danger of the ECB reacting with a hike in interest rates, since its inflation target was not en-
dangered as a result of the German policies, and consequently Ecofin could adopt a more le-
nient stance toward Germany. 
Thus, since both cases had very different implications for inflation in EMU as a whole, 
the other EMU/EU member-states responded with different (apparently counterintuitive) poli-
cies, while the ECB stood by as an acquiescing accomplice. As long as inflationary pressures 
are kept in check therefore, both the ECB and Ecofin are (within a broad and cyclically con-
tingent interpretation of fiscal discipline) relatively neutral with regard to the fiscal policy 
stance of individual member-states. When, however, inflationary dangers rise, Ecofin rapidly 
responds by sanctioning the member-state, in order to avoid a reaction from the part of the 
ECB (which would be interpreted by many as an over-reaction with dire consequences for 
both individual member-states and EMU as a whole), Since Ecofin cannot directly attack in-
flationary policies of member-states, it does so with the only weapon at its disposal: the sanc-
tioning procedures under the BEPG.  
This comparison between these two episodes suggests that the policy architecture around 
the SGP and the BEPG (the OMC) therefore has to be seen as a policy framework embedded 
in a broader set of institutions: the ECB's possible reaction set (which, while keeping an eye 
on broad macro-economic developments in EMU, disproportionately favours low inflation), 
on the one hand, and the wage bargaining system, which leads to disinflationary wage settle-
ments, on the other.  
This suggests that the triangle between Ecofin, the ECB and the wage bargaining systems 
is the crucial framework for understanding macro-economic policies in EMU. Through wage 
moderation, wage setters can directly contribute to low inflation (and they do so in most EMU 
member-states), thus keeping medium-term inflation on the ECB's target, and Ecofin offers 
some sort of arbitration between these two other actors and the governments.  
 
 
5. Conclusion: Rethinking the SGP 
 
In EMU, low inflation is a collective action problem for Ecofin to resolve. The SGP and more 
broadly the BEPG are the instruments for this; however, they operate against a background of 
two further institutions. The first one is the ECB who 'delegates' sanctioning --while preserv-Hancké: Political Economy of Fiscal Policy in EMU 13 
ing the (ultimately very coarse) weapon of interest rates-- to the member-states. The second 
element is provided by the labour relations systems in different countries that actively pursue 
disinflationary wage settlements. The BEPG (including the SGP) therefore have to be under-
stood as a critical element in a signalling game between the ECB, Ecofin and the wage-setting 
systems. 
Within such a redefined institutional framework, the SGP is already reconstructed: in-
stead of a rigid deflationary monetarist tool it has become in part a more flexible and prag-
matic macro-economic policy  instrument for the whole of EMU. As long as structural infla-
tion risks are low (which, all other things being equal, means that wage bargaining is disinfla-
tionary), both the ECB and Ecofin appear to tacitly accept a Keynesian fiscal policy over the 
cycle that leaves discretion to governments.  
Despite appearances to the contrary --and which has led, both among academic econo-
mists and policy-makers, to loudly voiced concerns over the future of EMU-- such a set-up 
provides a win-win situation for governments (represented, in the average, by Ecofin) and the 
ECB. Against a background of low inflationary risks, Ecofin seems to allow for (see Germany 
in 2002) and sometimes strongly recommends (see Ireland in 2001) fiscal policy to accom-
modate existing (and probably persisting) differences in the business cycles of different EMU 
member-states, and as a collective actor has adopted a policy of 'benign neglect' to small vio-
lations of the letter of the SGP (as long as the spirit is honoured), The ECB, in turn, for whom 
inflation containment is the single most important goal in its reaction function, benefits from 
the arrangement because disinflationary wage and fiscal policies obviously make it easier to 
reach that goal without a loss in output or rising unemployment, or --wishful thinking, per-
haps, but worth considering none the less-- would make more growth-oriented accommodat-
ing monetary policies possible. 
Such a framework is nothing less than a pragmatic Keynesian-inspired policy consensus 
between the macro-economic agents in EMU. Unions deliver low wage inflation, the ECB the 
conditions for growth, and governments use fiscal policy to smoothen asymmetric fluctua-
tions in the national business cycle. Critiques of the restrictive nature of the SGP certainly are 
correct, but it is hard to think of this reconfigured policy-making framework as simply a de-
flationary disciplining device.  
This brings us back to the issue at the beginning of the paper. A pessimistic interpretation 
of EMU is that it produces the worst of all possible worlds: an autistic central bank ('hearing 
but not listening'), a masochistic fiscal policy (the strict interpretation of the SGP), and a 
competitive wage policy in which unions in one country undercut wages in another. These 
outcomes are certainly possible in the current set-up and are present already in embryonic 
form. The other one, which was advocated here, is equally possible: the central bank sticks to 
a strict inflation target, but responds to (responsible) policies by wage-setters and govern-
ments (both institutions that at least in principle democratically represent their citizens and 
members) instead of trying to lead them into policy-making. The current debates on the SGP 
are important because they offer an opportunity to make explicit such a division of labour be-
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